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Abstract  
The paper examines the impact of the principle of proportionality for the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW). The only function of proportionality discussed here is concerning the 
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mutual recognition context. The argument is enunciated against the backdrop of over-
emphasis on the principle of mutual recognition to the end of speedy judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. The paper is structured in two levels; the central level of the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) case law analysis and the decentralised level of judicial authorities 
using the EAW. The analysis firstly explores the recent case law of the CJEU affirming the 
need to secure the operation of the mutual recognition and secondly the debate on overusing 
the instrument. It provides an analysis of the quest for a proportionality based analysis in the 
context of mutual recognition where fundamental rights protection are competing with fast 
judicial cooperation.  
Keywords 
‘Proportionality’, ‘European arrest warrant’, ‘fundamental rights’, ‘mutual recognition’, 
‘Radu’, ‘Melloni’ 
Introduction; EAW and the competing values of ‘extradition in a 
mutual recognition environment 
The framework decision on EAW1 provides for a judicial decision issued by one Member 
State and transmitted to another, with the view to request the arrest and the surrender of a 
person for the purpose of his prosecution or execution of a sentence or a detention order. 
EAW is the first instrument of mutual recognition, the so-called ‘cornerstone’ of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.2  It is based on a high level of mutual trust between Member 
                                                          
1 Council Framework Decision (2002/584/JHA) of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States  OJ L 190/1 
2 Ibid ,  recital 6; For a critique on the transfer of mutual recognition from internal market to judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters see Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf, 'Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A 
Step too Far too Soon? Case Study - The European Arrest Warrant' (2004) 10 European Law Journal 200, 200; 
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States, as highlighted by the preamble of the framework decision.3 EAW may be issued for 
acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least twelve months or when the requested person is 
already tried and given a custodial sentence or a detention order of at least four months.4 The 
scope of the EAW also extends to a list of serious offences if they are punished by the law of 
the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period 
of at least three years.5 For this list of offences the requirement of double criminality of the 
act was abolished.  
The measure was adopted because the previous formal extradition procedures6 were 
insufficient.7 This need became more apparent in view of EU counter-terrorism policy and 
EAW was adopted ‘as a central plank of this policy’8 along with the Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism.9 Moreover, the objective to become an AFSJ highlighted the need to 
replace the previous politicised and slow extradition mechanism with a simplified surrender 
system among judicial authorities.10 So, the framework decision has replaced the previous EU 
                                                          
3 190/1, recital 10 
4 Ibid, Art 2(1) 
5 Ibid, Art 2(2) 
6 European Convention on Extradition; European Convention on the suppression of terrorism 1977; Convention 
of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at 
their common borders OJ L239 ;   EAW Arts 3,4 
7 EAW, recital 1; Tampere Presidency Conclusions, 305  
8 Cian Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law; Pre-emption and the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 183; 
Anne Weyembergh, 'L'impact du 11 septembre sur l'équilibre sécurité/liberté dans l'espace pénal européen' in 
Bribosia and Weyembergh (ed), Lutte contre le terrorisme et droits fondamentaux, (Bruylant, collection Droit et 
Justice 2002) 
9 Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA) of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism OJ  L 164 
10 EAW, recital 5 
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and international law extradition system of transfer of the individuals,11 moving the shift from 
political to judicial power. The EAW procedure is a speedy process as judicial authorities 
complete a form and operate under limited time-frame and strict deadlines.12  
EAW has attracted a huge debate13 concerning the concept of surrender of the country’s 
citizens, the partial abolition of the dual criminality requirement and fundamental rights 
safeguards in view of the lack of a respective ground for refusal. Some issues have been 
addressed to a certain extent by the CJEU.14 The prevailing view is that the new surrender 
                                                          
11 European Convention on Extradition 1957; Convention of 10 March 1995 on simplified extradition procedure 
between the Member States of the European Union OJ C78; Convention implementing Schengen Agreement, 
19;  
12EAW, Arts 15, 17, 22, 23  
13 For an overview see Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal law (Modern Studies in European Law, 1st edn, Hart 
Publishing 2009) 120-142;  Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford EU Law library, 3 edn, 
OUP 2011) 696-710; Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law; Pre-emption and the Rule of Law ch 7; Massimo 
Fichera, 'The implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European Union: law, policy and practice', 
University of Edinburgh (2009); Ester Herlin-Karnell, 'European Arrest Warrant Cases and the principles of 
Non-Discrimination and EU Citizenship' (2010) 73 Modern Law Review ; Theodore Konstadinides, ‘The 
Europeanisation of Extradition: How many Light Years Away to Mutual Confidence?’ in Theodore 
Konstadinides and Christina Eckes (ed), Crime within the Area of Freedom Security and Justice: A European 
Public Order (Cambridge University Press 2011); Nico Keijzer  and Elies van Sliedregt (ed), The European 
Arrest Warrant in Practice (Asser Press 2009) 
14 Steve Peers, 'The European Arrest Warrant: The Dilemmas of Mutual Recognition, Human Rights and EU 
Citizenship' in Court of Justice of the European Union (ed), The Court of Justice and the Construction of 
Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law - La Cour de Justice et la Construction de 
l'Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence (Court of Justice of the European Union 
2013) 
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system is successful.15 This paper focuses on remaining problems; firstly on the overreliance 
of the case law on mutual recognition creating an imbalance between security interests and 
fundamental rights protection; secondly on the overuse of the instrument by the national 
judicial authorities. Exploring on the one hand the recent judgments of Radu and Melloni and 
on the other hand the debate on the disproportionate use of the EAW, the paper investigates 
whether a proportionality based review can make a change in EAW equilibrium. The idea of 
‘a proportionate answer for a Europe of Rights’ was firstly expressed by Fichera and Herlin-
Karnell.16 With regard to the EAW case law, they offered ‘fragments of proportionality’17 
manifestations  when its rationale is adopted –to a limited extent- by the Court and 
acknowledge that the ‘exact impact of proportionality … remains to be crystallised’. It is here 
that this paper intends to fit. This piece intends to contribute to the literature of EU criminal 
law by assessing to a greater extent the impact of proportionality for EAW. It does so by 
providing a more sophisticated understanding of proportionality with commitment to a 
certain theory, by adopting a concrete focus on EAW and the mutual recognition context and 
fundamental rights protection and analysis.  
The case law  is discerned by two centrifugal powers; the protection of fundamental rights of 
the person sought to be arrested and surrendered and the states’ interest to arrest the person 
                                                          
15 For recent empirical assessments of the mechanism see Cian C. Murphy Aldo Zammit Borat and Lucy Hoyte, 
Prosecutor and Government Officials Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of the European 
Arrest Warrant (SECILE: Securing Europe through Counter-Terrorism – Impact, Legitimacy
 & Effectiveness, 2014); Anne Weyembergh Ines Armada and Chloe Brière, 'Critical Assessment of the 
existing European arrest warrant framework decision' (2014) European Parliament, DG for Internal policies of 
the Union  
16 Massimo Fichera and Ester Herlin-Karnell, 'The Margin of Appreciation Test and Balancing in the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice: A Proportionate Answer for a Europe of Rights?' (2013) European Public Law  
17 Ibid 771 
6 
 
*PhD Candidate, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London  
 
with the minimum of formalities and employ the system of the EAW in its full effectiveness. 
Fundamental rights protection in the EAW context mainly concerns rights of due process in 
general and in particular the right to effective judicial protection, the right to a fair trial and 
the defence rights with regard to criminal trials. The security based interests on the other hand 
are shaped by the commitment of the EU to create an area of security and justice. To this end 
the judicial authorities of the Member States cooperate in a spirit of mutual trust and 
recognise each other’s judicial decisions (mutual recognition).  
The paper investigates whether proportionality can make a change to the EAW equilibrium. 
The principle of proportionality is a multifaceted principle pertaining to different areas of law 
and to different functions.18 Focusing on EU criminal law, it only engages with the 
proportionality based analysis in mutual recognition setting and discusses the balancing 
between fundamental rights protection against the interest of speedy cooperation in the 
framework of EAW. Therefore the paper does not consider proportionality with regard to 
criminalisation and with regard to the exercise of EU competence in substantive criminal law. 
It only engages with the particular function of proportionality as regards fundamental rights 
in the context of mutual recognition. More particularly, it only discusses case law pertaining 
to fair trial rights.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the paper does not aim to contribute to the existing 
literature of fundamental constitutional rights theory and the development of the principle of 
proportionality in constitutional law. The paper rather relies on the existing developed 
theories of rights and proportionality so as to make a contribution of an original idea to 
                                                          
18 Proportionality is identified in various fields of law. For substantive criminal law see Douglas Husak, 'The 
Criminal Law as a Last Resort' (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies J. W. Ouwerkerk, 'Criminalisation as a 
Last Resort: A National Principle Under the Pressure of Europeanisation?' (2012) 3 New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 228 For penology see Andrew von Hirsch, 'Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment' 
(1992) 16 Crime and Justice  For constitutional law see Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Matthews, 'Proportionality 
balancing and global constitutionalism' (2009) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73;  For EU law see 
Tor-Inge Harbo, 'The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law' (2010) 16 European Law Journal  
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fundamental rights protection in the EAW framework of mutual recognition in the field of 
EU law.  
This paper reflects on two levels of analysis; one pertaining to the central level of judicial 
review by the CJEU and the second with reference to the debate on overusing the EAW even 
for petty crimes. The paper firstly sets the theoretical understanding of the principle of 
proportionality. Secondly it critically discusses recent significant judgments of the CJEU in 
relation to fair trial rights and finally explores the problematic overuse of the instrument even 
in minor offences. It is acknowledged that proportionality should be inherent in the operation 
of mutual recognition as compared to a blind model of mutual recognition.19 Eventually, the 
paper sheds light on the impact of proportionality at two different levels with a common 
element, mutual recognition.  At the central CJEU level, it is argued that a stricto-sensu 
proportionality analysis conducted by the Court could lead to the development of common 
criteria to assess the surrender. It is argued that mutual recognition should not be treated as an 
objective with the effect of trumping fundamental rights, especially when a higher level of 
fundamental rights protection is at stake. Finally at the national level of mutual recognition, it 
is argued that the national judicial authorities, performing the infamous suggested 
proportionality test should reflect on the objectives of the EAW, the existence of alternatives 
and on certain criteria developed by the judicial authorities.  
Proportionality based analysis 
Having set the scope of the paper, it is important to take into account the theoretical 
framework of proportionality.20 As it is clarified at the introduction, the paper does not intend 
                                                          
19 Fichera and Herlin-Karnell, 'The Margin of Appreciation Test and Balancing in the Area of Freedom Security 
and Justice: A Proportionate Answer for a Europe of Rights?' 764 
20 There is a vast amount of literature in constitutional theory: Alec Stone Sweet, 'All Things in Proportion? 
American Rights Doctrine and the Problem of Balancing' (2011) 60 Emory Law Journal ; Moshe Cohen-Eliya & 
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to make a contribution to constitutional law theory. It clearly focuses on the context of mutual 
recognition and the EAW operation. Having said that, it is necessary to employ a certain, 
consistent and realistic understanding of proportionality throughout the paper in order to 
assess its impact. In line with these criteria, the work of Klatt and Meister was chosen, which 
is in turn influenced by the work of Alexy.21 The value of the principle is recognised despite 
being recently challenged.22 The paper also acknowledges what Moller had argued; the 
incorrect application of the principle by courts should not be confused with the principle as 
such rendering it pointless.23  
The proportionality based analysis is composed of four stages; legitimate objective stage, 
suitability stage, necessity stage and stricto sensu proportionality/balancing stage. At the first 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Iddo Porat, 'American balancing and german proportionality: The historical origins' (2010) 8 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 263 ; Matthews, 'Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism'; Moshe 
Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (CUP 2013); Mattias Kumm, 'The Idea 
of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justifi cation: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review' 
(2010) 4 Law & Ethics Hum Rts ; Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional rights and their limitations 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 
21 Matthias Klatt and Moritz Meister, The constitutional structure of proportionality (Oxford University Press 
2012); Robert Alexy, A theory of constitutional rights (Oxford University Press 2002) 
22 On the recent debate on the value of the principle see Grégoire Webber, 'Proportionality, Balancing, and the 
Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship' (2010) 23 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence ; Stavros 
Tsakyrakis, 'Proportionality: An assault on human rights?' (2009) 7 Int' l J Const L 468; Matthias Klatt and 
Moritz Meister, 'Proportionality—a benefit to human rights? Remarks on the I·CON controversy' (2012) 10 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 687; Guglielmo Verdirame, 'Rescuing Human Rights from 
Proportionality ' (2014) Legal Studies Research Paper Series, paper no 2014-14 ; Madhav Khosla, 
'Proportionality: An assault on human rights?: A reply' (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 298 
23 Kai Möller, 'Proportionality: Challenging the critics' (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
709 
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stage it is considered whether the measure in question involves a legitimate objective. At the 
second stage, it is asked whether the measure is suitable to achieve the required result. At the 
third stage, it is considered whether the limitations that the measure requires are necessary 
and whether it is the least restrictive measure. Finally, the last stage involves a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Klatt and Meister, in an attempt to define the first stage, suggest that only interests of 
constitutional status can be accepted as legitimate goals.24 At the second stage, the 
interference must be a suitable means to achieve the goal; otherwise the measure is rendered 
unsuitable and there is no point for balancing. Questions like ‘is the interference with this 
right actually going to serve the policy pursued?’ are asked at this stage. At the stage of 
necessity there are two considerations that should be taken into account. Firstly, it should be 
identified whether there are other alternatives which lead to the same result and in case there 
is another measure which requires less interference with the right, the measure in question 
should be considered as failing the review.  
Stricto-sensu proportionality, the fourth stage, balances all the relevant legitimate, suitable 
and necessary considerations acting as limiting clauses against the right at issue, which have 
made it to this stage ‘surviving’ the scrutiny of the previous stages. The reasoning of this 
stage is based on the logic that the restrictive interests must not pose a disproportionate 
burden to the right-holder (balancing stage-proportionality in the strict/narrow sense). It has 
to be decided here which one of the conflicting values takes priority in every case in concreto 
and it is commonly said that those values need to be balanced in order to see whether the 
                                                          
24 Matthias Klatt&Moritz Meister, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (OUP 2013) 10 
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sacrifice is worthy of the gain. According to Alexy, balancing can be broken down into three 
steps.25  
a. Establishing the degree of non-satisfaction or of detriment to the first ‘principle’ (in 
accordance with his terminology) is the first step,  
b. Establishing the importance of satisfying the competing principle is the second step and  
c. Establishing whether the importance of satisfying the second principle justifies the non-
satisfaction or the detriment of the first one.  
The paper adopts a trump theory of rights, according to which, rights have a priority status 
against other competing public considerations, in contrast to the interest model which 
conceptualises rights as interests equal to competing public interests.26 According to the 
trump model followed here, rights should enjoy priority over other considerations. However, 
rights which are absolute and therefore should ‘trump’ any other consideration, are in fact 
rare. The rest are relative which should be amenable to limitations. For that reason, a strong 
trump theory of rights that accepts that rights should trump every consideration is accepted 
only for those rights which are absolute and should not be amenable to limitations, such as 
the right not to be tortured. For the rest of the rights, a weak-trump theory of rights in 
particular is adopted here. This theory combines both balancing and trumping as opposed to 
the interests theory and the strong trumps theory. It considers rights as having priority over 
other considerations but that they are also balanced against other strong constitutional 
values.27  
                                                          
25 Robert Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433, 436–7. 
26 Klatt and Meister, The constitutional structure of proportionality ; Möller, 'Proportionality: Challenging the 
critics'  
27 Klatt and Meister, The constitutional structure of proportionality  ch2  
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Through balancing, speedy judicial cooperation in criminal matters is acknowledged and 
rights can be limited for the purpose of achieving certain objectives illustrated at the Treaties. 
Concurrently, through trumping, the rights are conceived as having a priority status in 
relation to their competing interest with the result that they cannot be simply outweighed by 
the security interests that have the effect of limiting them. Those rights can only be overruled 
by other constitutional values.28 Considerations which do not enjoy constitutional status 
cannot be balanced against fundamental rights. It follows that the principle is not always 
relevant in fundamental rights protection. The nature of the right determines whether judicial 
reasoning should use proportionality based reasoning or not.  
The quest for proportionality at the central judicial review of the CJEU 
with reference to EAW and mutual recognition  
 
In EAW case law, a conflict between fundamental rights protection and the interest to arrest 
and surrender the person with the minimum of formalities and delays is observed. The 
Court’s interpretations of the framework decision are more beneficial for the interest to fast 
and effective judicial cooperation in a plethora of cases.29 Mutual recognition, mutual trust, 
cooperation without delays are values that have a central position in the judicial reasoning of 
the CJEU case law on the EAW, which is in particular discussed here. Mutual recognition is 
treated by the Court as a constitutional value with the effect of trumping competing 
considerations about fundamental rights violations. The imbalance is problematic, in view of 
the commitment of the EU to provide an area of freedom and justice to its citizens, apart from 
                                                          
28 Ibid ch 2  
29 Case C-303/05 Advocaten Voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I- 03633 ; Case C-66/08 Kozlowski [2008] ECR I- 
06041 ; Case C-296/08 Santesteban [2008] ECR I- 06307 ; Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] nyr ; Case C-396/11 
Radu [2013] nyr r; Case C-261/09 Mantello [2010] ECR I- 11477  
12 
 
*PhD Candidate, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London  
 
an area of security. The EU is moreover founded on ‘the values of respect of human dignity, 
freedom, democracy… the rule of law and respect of human rights’ according to Article 2 
TEU.  
It should be noted that the presumption of mutual trust was recently rebutted in the context of 
asylum system, where the Court had stated ‘that European Union law precludes the 
application of a conclusive presumption’.30 This development in asylum law was expected to 
influence EAW case law31 but instead the Court in Radu ruled that the interpretation of the 
framework decision in light of the Charter does not allow the judicial authorities to refuse to 
execute an EAW even in the event that fundamental rights are breached.32  
This section of the paper will assess the impact of a proportionality based analysis in the 
setting of EAW with particular regard to the operation of the mutual recognition setting. The 
analysis focuses on recent case law of the CJEU.  
Radu; Execution of an EAW in the event of defence rights violations in light 
of proportionality 
In Radu the CJEU was asked inter alia whether the executing judicial authority may refuse to 
execute the EAW in light of a potential breach of the right to fair trial and defence rights 
(Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR or Articles 6, 48 and 52 of the Charter). The question was 
raised in the context of a preliminary reference made by the Romanian Court of Appeal. Mr 
Radu was a Romanian national, subject to four arrest warrants, issued by the German judicial 
                                                          
30 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece Application no 30696/09 (ECHR 21 January 2011) ; Joined Cases C-411/10 
N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and C-493/10 M.E. and Others v Refugee Applications , para 
105; Malin Thunberg Schunke, Whose Responsibility? A Study of Transnational Defence Rights and Mutual 
Recognition of Judicial Decisions within the EU, vol 16 (Supranational Criminal Law, Intersentia 2013) 
31 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr Opinion of AG Sharpston para 76 
32 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyrr, para 39 
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authority for the purpose of conducting criminal prosecution in respect of acts of robbery. 
The judicial authorities of the Member States are in principle obliged to execute an EAW 
except for certain circumstances, provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of the framework decision. 
The articles do not provide for a specific ground for refusal for fundamental rights violations. 
However, fundamental rights considerations are identified in various places of the measure 
such as Article 1 (3), which proclaims Member States obligation to respect fundamental 
rights.  
Mr Radu, the requested person, claimed that he had ‘not been notified in respect of the 
charges against him, not been subpoenaed in respect of them and found himself in a situation 
where it was completely impossible to defend himself’.33 As he did not consent to his 
surrender, he claimed that the contested warrants were issued without him having been 
summoned or having had a possibility of hiring a lawyer or presenting his defense, in breach 
of Articles 47 and 48 of the EUCFR and Article 6 of the ECHR.34 The CJEU was asked by 
the Romanian Court of Appeal, inter alia, whether the executing judicial authority may 
refuse to execute an EAW, where the execution of the EAW would infringe or would risk 
infringing the right to a fair trial and the defence rights.  The question for the Court is 
whether, in light of the potential breaches of the right to a fair trial and the defence rights, the 
framework decision should be read in such a way as to allow an executing authority to refuse 
to execute an EAW because it was issued against a backdrop of rights breaches or because 
there is a serious danger of future rights breaches.  
The Court made reference to the purpose of the instrument to replace the multilateral system 
of extradition between the Member States with a system of surrender between the judicial 
                                                          
33 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr Opinion of AG Sharpston para 65; Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr paras 26, 
29  
34 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr para 29 
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authorities and that this system of surrender is based on the principle of mutual recognition35 
as was affirmed by recent case law.36 It further elaborated on the objective of the framework 
decision to facilitate and speed up the judicial cooperation with the purpose of contributing to 
the objective of creating a European space of freedom, security and justice.37 The Court 
stressed that the Member States are ‘in principle obliged’ to implement an EAW38 and that 
this strict obligation is further qualified only by the explicit exceptions and guarantees that 
the law provides in Articles 3, 4, 4a and 5 of the framework decision.39  
The Court further clarifies that the EAW in question was issued for the purpose of conducting 
a criminal prosecution and indicates that this scenario does not fall within the scope of 
exceptions for executing an EAW that the law provides.40 It then simply asserts that respect 
for the rights does not require that the executing authority may refuse to execute an EAW, in 
the event of fundamental rights breaches.41 The Court remained loyal to the letter of the 
instrument with respect to the exhausting list of ground for refusal. It left no space for any 
interpretation enlightened by the Charter or even by Article 1(3) of the framework decision, 
read in conjunction with Article 6 TEU and the Charter provisions. The only argument 
provided in this respect was that if the person was to be heard before the issuing authority, 
this would inevitably affect the effectiveness of the instrument, would lead to the failure of 
the system of surrender and would consequently forestall the achievement of an AFSJ.42 
                                                          
35 Ibid para 33 
36 Case C-42/11 Lopes Da Silva Jorge [2012] ECLI 517 para 28 
37 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr para 34 
38 Ibid para 35 
39 Ibid paras 36, 37 
40 Ibid para 38 
41 Ibid para 39 
42 Ibid para 40  
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Following the latter generalised statement, the Court in a spirit of reassurance, stated that the 
‘European legislature has ensured that the right to be heard will be observed in the executing 
Member State’. It then added the last word. The observance of the right to be heard will be 
performed in such a way so as not to compromise the effectiveness of the EAW system.43 
The last insertion manifestly demonstrates that the focus of the Court is the effectiveness of 
the surrender system. The analysis asserts rather than substantiates the arguments.  
The different outcome of a proportionality based reasoning 
This section aims to substantiate the hypothesis that the court’s ruling would have not relied 
on a blind understanding of mutual recognition if a proportionality based analysis was 
applied by the CJEU in order to assess the possibility of refusal.  
Had the Court employed a proportionality based reasoning, it should have first examined 
whether the measure serves a legitimate objective. The EAW serves the objective of fast 
judicial cooperation which serves the end of an area of freedom, security and justice, in the 
spirit of mutual trust. The objective is to facilitate the judicial cooperation in cross-border 
serious crimes and to simplify the extradition procedures.44 It is an objective set both by the 
framework decision and by the Treaties.45 Therefore, the first stage of proportionality is 
satisfied.46 Mr Radu was sought to be prosecuted by Germany for the offence of aggravated 
robbery, which constitutes a serious crime in both countries. Setting an exhaustive list of 
grounds for refusal for the executing judicial authority is moreover a suitable means to 
achieve the objective of fast cooperation, which satisfies the second stage of the test.47 
                                                          
43 Ibid para 41 
44 EAW, Preamble, Recital 1, 3 
45 TFEU, Art 82 
46 Klatt and Meister, The constitutional structure of proportionality 10 
47 Ibid 9 
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Nevertheless, under the third stage of a proportionality test, the Court’s decision to prohibit 
the executing state from refusing to execute the EAW in light of an interpretation informed 
by fundamental rights obligation is not substantiated as necessary. The assertion that the 
surrender system is based on the principle of mutual recognition and that a different result 
would endanger the effectiveness of the instrument are not adequate arguments.48  
Stricto sensu proportionality; Seriousness and remediability of the violation as criteria 
for balancing 
This balancing stage will secure that the surrender of the requested person is not manifestly 
disproportionate. At this stage, the executing judicial authority, is called to balance the 
different interests, as long as the surrender passed the other three tests.  
Taking a strict interpretation on grounds for refusal solely based on the list of grounds with 
the result of precluding fundamental rights considerations to inform a wider interpretation is 
moreover not consistent with the framework decision per se. Member States’ obligation to 
respect fundamental rights is stressed both at Recital 12 of the Preamble and at Article 1 (3) 
of the framework decision. In contrast to the Court, Advocate General Sharspton states that 
Member States should be in principle obliged to ‘act upon a European Arrest Warrant’,49 as 
otherwise the spirit of mutual recognition would not be meaningful. However, mutual 
recognition should not be blind.50  
The clarification that the EAW in question was issued for the purpose of conducting criminal 
prosecution and that hearing the person would go against the whole spirit of the EAW is 
furthermore not convincing. This is because of the coercive quality of the EAW effects. The 
requested person is subject to a definitive judgment of a judicial authority of a state different 
                                                          
48 Ibid 
49 Case C-261/09 Mantello [2010] ECR I- 11477, Opinion of AG Bot, para 36 
50 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr Opinion of AG Sharpston para 69 
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from the one where he resides and with different jurisdiction. The arrest and transfer result in 
a surrender to the alien (for him) authorities. What is more, he was not heard for this 
definitive judgment issued by alien authorities which resulted in his own relocation. As much 
as it is the spirit of the EAW to necessitate the surprise of the defendant (according to the 
CJEU), it is the spirit and the coercive effects of the same instrument that necessitate a more 
wide interpretation of it. Furthermore, the cases Andrew Symerou, Edmond Arapi and 
Graham Mitchell are well-known and should not be ignored by the central European 
judiciary.51 Given that these concerns on fundamental rights protection undermine the spirit 
of mutual trust an interpretation not as strict as the one provided by the Court would empower 
the judicial authorities to be more flexible and balance the cases’ different considerations. 
Having said that, the paper does not advocate against the principle of mutual recognition. The 
value of the EAW system and of mutually recognising and trusting judgments across the EU 
is admittedly high. However, the coercive effect of the instrument coupled with fundamental 
rights concerns demonstrate that the Court’s judgment is missing those shortcomings. 
Generally establishing that the executing authorities cannot refuse in any case to execute an 
EAW, even when it is issued for the purpose of a criminal prosecution, on the grounds that 
the requested person was not heard by the issuing state is an absolute judgment whose 
necessity was not adequately demonstrated. A reflection on certain criteria is necessary. 
The seriousness of the violation  
The violation at issue –past or the risk of a future one- must be so detrimental that the core of 
the right to fair trial and to substantially and adequately defend oneself are absolutely 
impaired.  In this respect, Advocate General Sharpton developed a systematic and informed 
reasoning, in Radu. She suggested, in her opinion, a sophisticated balancing test for the 
                                                          
51 http://www.fairtrials.org/cases/andrew-symeou/; http://www.fairtrials.org/cases/graham-mitchell/; 
http://www.fairtrials.org/cases/edmond-arapi/  
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executing judicial authority to carry out. Although the executing judicial authorities are in 
principle engaged to surrendering the person,52 she argues that they can refuse the request for 
surrender, ‘where it is demonstrated that the human rights of the person whose surrender is 
requested have been infringed, or will be infringed, as part of or following the surrender 
process’.53 She suggests that this refusal should be ‘exceptional’ and for reasons such as 
complying with the EAW would ‘fundamentally to destroy the fairness of the process’.54  
In this respect, it is essential to consider closely the rights at issue in order to assess the 
seriousness of the violation. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to 
be informed ‘of the nature and cause of the accusation against him’, as it is provided for by 
Article 6 (3a) ECHR. The information shall be given promptly and in a language that the 
person understands, according to the same article. At EU level two directives were adopted in 
this respect; one on the right to information in criminal proceeding55 and another on the right 
to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings.56 The absence of written translation 
of the indictment which might result in the misinformation and the hindrance of the defence 
of the person accused violates Article 6 (3a), according to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg 
court.57  
Moreover, both Article 6 (3b) ECHR and Article 14 (3b) ICCPR provide for the right to 
prepare the defence which focuses on two elements. First the defendant shall have adequate 
                                                          
52 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 68  
53 Ibid, para 97 
54 Ibid  
55 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:280:0001:0007:en:PDF  
56 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:142:0001:0010:en:PDF  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:142:0001:0010:en:PDF  
57 Kamasinski 1989 ECHR A168 para 81 
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time to prepare and second he shall have adequate facilities. ICCPR adds a third element, that 
of communication with a counsel of the defendant’s own choosing, which applies at the 
appeal stage of criminal proceedings.  
Article 6 (3c) ECHR furthermore provides that everyone who is charged with a criminal 
offence shall have the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance. The 
lawyer should be of his own choosing, which highlights that the legal assistance must be 
substantial and real. If the defendant does not have the sufficient means to pay for legal 
assistance, it should be provided to him for free.  
According to the ECtHR case law with regard to grounds for refusal to extradite, general 
references to a risk of fundamental rights violation in a country are not accepted as a ground 
for refusal.58 The reasons should be serious and well-founded. In Soering v United Kingdom 
the ECtHR held that the a state should not extradite the requested person, ‘where substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real 
risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 
requesting country’.59 A ‘flagrant denial’ of the right to fair trial in particular may give rise to 
the refusal of the contracting state to extradite the requesting person according the Strasbourg 
court. 
Although the Soering doctrine of the ECtHR was not transposed in EAW case law of the 
CJEU, similar reasoning is identifiable in CJEU jurisprudence,60 where the Court was asked 
to interpret the Regulation establishing criteria for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an asylum application. The Court was asked to assess the impact of Article 4 
                                                          
58 Dzhaksybergenov v Ukraine Application no 12343/10 (ECtHR  10 February 2011)  para 37 
59 Soering v United Kingdom Application no 14038/88  (ECtHR 07 July 1989) , para 44 
60 Case C-411/10 N.S. and Others [2011] ECR I-13905  
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of the Charter with regard to prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment to the interpretation of this regulation. It held that the Member States may not 
transfer an asylum seeker to another Member State, ‘where they cannot be unaware that 
systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum 
seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum 
seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment’.61 
Advocate General Sharpston eventually opinioned in Radu that the CJEU should not establish 
the threshold of a flagrant denial of the requested person’s fundamental rights.62 She 
considers that this test is unduly stringent,63 as it might require that every part of the process 
had violated the fundamental rights. She submits her approach which is that the crucial 
element is whether the infringement is so fundamental that it  absolutely impairs the fairness 
of the process, which was also suggested by Lord Phillips in the case RB (Algeria) and 
Another v Secretary of State for the Home Department.64   
In this paper, it is argued that the seriousness of the violation is certainly a criterion to be 
balanced at the fourth stage, in line with what Advocate General Sharpston had suggested and 
in line with the ECtHR in Soering. The violation of the right must be so serious that the right 
holder is absolutely divested of the possibility to fairly enjoy his due process rights to the 
extent that this is not remediable.  
Moreover, another indication that the Court could provide is that the crucial element must be 
examined in concreto with particular regard to the normative content of the right in question, 
                                                          
61 Ibid, para 94 
62 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 82 
63 Ibid, para 83 
64 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldjudgmt/jd090218/rbalge-1.htm para 136 
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as it is developed by the ECtHR, the CJEU –if there is relevant case law- and by the national 
constitutional traditions.   For instance, in Radu,65 the alleged violations concerned, inter alia, 
the right to be informed and the right to prepare the defence. In light of the first right, 
everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be informed ‘of the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him’, as provided for by Article 6 (3a) ECHR. At EU 
level two directives were adopted in this respect; one on the right to information in criminal 
proceeding66 and another on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings.67 Moreover, the framework decision provides for the arrested person’s right to 
be informed of the EAW and of its contents.68 According to ECtHR case law the information 
shall be given promptly and in a language that the person understands, according to the same 
article. The absence of written translation of the indictment which might result in the 
misinformation and the hindrance of the defence of the person accused violates Article 6 (3a), 
according to the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court.69  
In addition, Article 6 (3b) ECHR and Article 14 (3b) ICCPR provide for the right to prepare 
the defence which focuses on two elements. First the defendant shall have adequate time to 
prepare and second he shall have adequate facilities. The adequate preparation of defence 
requires that the defendant or his counsel should be able to have access to the case and any 
evidence against the defendant.70 In this respect, it was ruled by the ECtHR in 
Hatzianastasiou that Greece violated the right to prepare the defence because Article 425 (1) 
                                                          
65 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr Opinion of AG Sharpston65 
66 Directive 2012/13/EU of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/1 
67 Directive 2010/64/EU of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings [2010] OJ L 280/1 
68 EAW Article 11 (1) 
69 Kamasinski v Austria Application no 9783/82 (ECtHR 19 December 1989) para 81 
70 Krenzow v Austria Application no. 12350/86 (ECtHR 21 September 1993) 
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of the Greek Military Penal Code provided for a 5 days term for appealing against the 
judgment of the military criminal tribunal, which starts from the oral announcement at the 
public hearing of the ruling. The judges did not have to develop their reasoning at the 
announcement of the ruling, which prevented the defendant from preparing for his appeal as 
he was deprived of the ability to submit the reasons why the first stage ruling was 
erroneous.71 
In Radu, the applicant claimed that he was neither informed of the charges against him, nor 
was he subject to subpoena, with the result that his defence was impaired. It is correct that not 
being informed in due time of the charges and not being subject to subpoena can impair the 
fairness of the process. Without information on the specific charges against oneself and 
without being summoned, it is indeed difficult to prepare the defence of the case. It is also 
true that the strict time limits that the framework instrument sets render the preparation of the 
defence even more difficult, especially for someone who is not aware of why he is arrested. 
Therefore, his rights were seriously breached. 
The question is whether the violation is so detrimental that the fairness of the process as a 
whole is destroyed, to such a degree that the person is actually divested of any possibility to 
enjoy the normative content of the specific right, as is suggested in the paper. The condition 
of the seriousness of the violation in tandem with the normative content of the right should be 
accompanied by a condition of remediability. The violation in question can clearly be 
remedied so that the person retains the time needed to prepare his defence. To this point 
Advocate General suggested that the executing authority may not refuse to execute an EAW 
in the event of breaches which are remediable.72 A lack of subpoena is a remediable breach of 
                                                          
71 Hadzianastassiou v Greece Application no. 12945/87 (ECtHR 16 December 1992) 
72 Case C-396/11 Radu [2013] nyr Opinion of AG Sharpston , para 88 
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the fair trial right which alone does not justify the refusal, according to her opinion.73  As a 
result, Mr Radu is not in a position where his rights are so detrimentally impaired that they 
cannot be remedied and therefore he is not absolutely prevented from preparing his defence.  
Hence, it is argued here that the CJEU, instead of affirming strict adherence with mutual 
recognition and precluding any refusal to execute, could have developed certain central 
guidelines for the national judicial authorities. Whether the violation can be remedied or not 
must constitute a criterion for the executing authorities to consider since the interest to 
judicial cooperation in a spirit of mutual trust must also shape the mentality of the judicial 
authorities across the EU. The knowledge that a fundamental right violation can be remedied 
in the future might lead to the issuing authority neglecting its fundamental right protection 
obligation. Therefore, it is argued that when a violation of the right by the issuing authority 
has been identified, the executing authority may not surrender the person unless it secures 
that the issuing authority will definitely provide for a remedy. 
Melloni; Execution of an EAW issued in absentia ignoring national 
constitutional right to appeal in light of proportionality 
The Court in Melloni was asked whether it is permissible for the executing state to make the 
surrender of the requested person, convicted in absentia, conditional upon a subsequent 
retrial at the issuing state. This higher level of protection was provided by the Spanish 
constitutional law in contrast to the framework decision on the EAW which explicitly 
prohibits the executing state from refusing to cooperate under the circumstances of the case. 
The Court faced with a supremacy type of question delivered a landmark ruling firstly 
reiterating EU law primacy. Secondly it stated that the framework decision in light of Article 
of 53 of the Charter should be interpreted in a way that the executing Member State is not 
allowed to make the surrender conditional upon the conviction rendered in absentia being 
                                                          
73 Ibid, para 90  
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open to review in the issuing Member State. The Court again and similarly to Radu argued 
that allowing the executing authority to make the surrender of the person convicted in 
absentia conditional upon a subsequent review of the judgment leading to an EAW would 
undermine the efficacy of the framework decision.74 It is argued here that again the Court’s 
reasoning extensively relied on the preservation of mutual recognition and the efficacy of the 
surrender system, to the detriment of lowering the level of protection of a fair trial right as it 
is enshrined by the national constitutional law.  The following sections argue on the basis of 
the first stage of proportionality that the objectives set out by the Court do not enjoy the 
adequate constitutional status in order to be balanced against fundamental rights protection 
enshrined at constitutional level. 
Mutual recognition as means and not an objective 
The Court stated that the framework decision established a simplified and more effective 
system for the surrender of persons. Facilitating and accelerating judicial cooperation, as a 
result, aims to contribute to the objective set for the European Union to become an AFSJ. AG 
Bot opinioned that the objective of creating an area of freedom security and justice shapes the 
framework of fundamental rights protection within the EU.75 The Court, in Melloni, referred 
to the interest of establishing an AFSJ,76 a primary law objective enshrined in the Treaties, as 
well as respect for the principles of mutual recognition and effectiveness,77 general principles 
of EU law and the simplification of the extradition system, secondary law objectives.78 
                                                          
74 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] nyr para 63 
75 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] nyr, Opinion of AG Bot , paras 107,112,113,115 
76 Ibid, paras 107,112,113,115 
77 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] nyr, para 62 
78 Ibid, para 43 
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First, it is argued that not all the interests shaping law-making here should be capable of 
trumping constitutional fundamental rights. It is suggested here that not all the interests 
should be accepted as objectives, in the sense granted to them by the first stage of the 
proportionality tests, as they are not all equally valued by the constitutional treaties. The 
interest of preserving an area of freedom and security within the European space and the 
objective of facilitating the judicial cooperation are objectives having high constitutional 
value in the Treaties. These interests could be discussed here and balanced against the 
possibility of preserving a higher level of fair trial rights protection as they, by nature, 
constitute objectives/aims.  
However, should the principle of mutual recognition also enjoy the status of a highly valued 
constitutional objective, whose promotion should justify the limitation of a constitutional 
right? The answer to the question here is negative. Acknowledging that the ultimate objective 
which stimulates the relevant law-making in this area is security, it follows that cooperation 
among judicial authorities is a penultimate objective to this end. The principle of mutual 
recognition is a regulatory method through which the above-mentioned law objectives are 
better achieved and promoted. There is admittedly an interest of preserving and facilitating 
the mutual recognition of judgments in Europe. However, this is not a law objective eligible 
to be balanced against fundamental rights protection. Therefore the Court’s stance of using 
the interest to maintain the mutual recognition of judgments, not only as a balancing unit but 
as a trump, is wrong.  
Secondary law objective 
Furthermore, the Court in Melloni invoked framework decision objectives in order to justify 
the limitations to the right. The judgment stated that Article 4a of the framework decision, 
including the limitation in question, should be interpreted in light of the objectives of the 
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framework decision 2009/299. This measure intended to facilitate JCCM through 
harmonisation of the grounds for non-recognition of judgments issued in absentia.79 
It is similarly suggested that the objective of the framework decision alone shall not be 
accepted as a legitimate aim in view of which the higher level of protection of national 
constitutional law should be prevented from applying. . It is merely an objective of a 
secondary law. Only objectives of constitutional value should be balanced against the 
fundamental rights of the requested person. The paper argues this strict precondition for the 
context of an evolving and sensitive field of law with far-reaching implications on 
fundamental rights, enshrined in national constitutions.  
Through this perspective of granting to rights a higher constitutional position than the one 
that secondary legislative measures enjoy, it follows that the Court would allow for the 
executing authority to make the surrender conditional upon a guarantee given by the issuing 
authority that the person will enjoy the right to appeal against the decision issued in absentia 
resulting in the EAW.  
Necessity 
Although it seems indeed necessary in view of effectiveness and consistency of EU law to 
choose the level of protection provided for by the framework decision, it is moreover not 
demonstrated how this is the least restrictive choice. It was simply asserted –rather than 
demonstrated- that this was necessary for respecting the principles of consistency and 
effectiveness. Lowering the level of protection below the threshold set by national 
constitutional law, would certainly require a more detailed and convincing analysis. This 
analysis should illustrate why this is the option leading to the expected result with the least 
possible interference with the right.  
                                                          
79 Ibid, para 43 
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The quest for proportionality at the national judicial authorities level 
 
Discussing proportionality for the surrender system established by the framework decision on 
EAW based on the principle of mutual recognition should also regard the disproportionate 
enforcement of the law in context.  
Execution of an EAW in cases of minor offences in light of proportionality   
In 2010, Poland of 38 million population has issued 3753 EAWs whereas Germany of 82 
million population issued 2096 and the UK of 62 million population issued 257 EAWs.80 As 
a result, the proportionality of the extradition as such is a major point of discussion.81 It is 
broadly acknowledged that proportionality is necessary in cases of minor offences.82 The 
                                                          
80 Fair Trials International, The European Arrest Warrant eight years on- Time to amend the FD? (2012) 3-5 
81 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council; On the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States (COM (2011) 175 final, 2011) 7-8; Meeting of Experts 
European Commission, Implementation of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European 
Arrest Warrant; The issue of proportionality, 5 November 2009); Council of the EU, Revised version of the 
European handbook on how to issue a European arrest warrant, 17 December 2010) 14; Council of the EU, 
Follow up to the evaluation reports on the fourth round of mutual evaluations: practical application of the 
European arrest warrant and the relevant surrender procedures between Member States, (18 November 2011); 
Council of Europe, Press Release: Overuse of the European Arrest Warrant-a threat to human rights (2011); 
Fair Trials International, The European Arrest Warrant eight years on- Time to amend the FD? 3, para 4 – 6 
82 Sergio Carrera Elspeth Guild, Nicholas Hernanz Europe's Most Wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European 
Arrest Warrant System (CEPS Special Report No 76/March 2013) 16-18; Sarah Haggenmüller, 'The Principle of 
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Mitsilegas, 'The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From automatic 
Inter-State Cooperation to the slow Emergence of the Individual' (2012) 31 Yearbook of European Law 319, 
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counterfeiting of 100 euros,83 the theft of two tyres84 or the theft of two piglets,85 theft of ten 
chickens,86 are only a few examples of petty crimes for which EAWs were issued.  
The use of disproportionate EAWs may in some cases lead to a breach of the requested 
person’s fundamental rights.87 An extradition for petty crimes might disproportionately limit 
the person right to liberty (Article 5 ECHR / Article 6 Charter), the right to a fair trial (Article 
6 ECHR / Article 47 Charter). The financial burden of the process should also not be ignored.  
Proportionality test 
Various solutions are extensively discussed with regard to the problem of disproportionate 
extradition.88 One suggestion concerns the legislative amendment of the instrument with the 
view of raising the threshold of Article 2 (1).89 Another suggestion, which is the prevailing 
one, concerns the introduction of a proportionality test conducted by the issuing authority, 
either through the amendment of the framework decision90 or without an amendment. A third 
suggestion concerns again the introduction of a proportionality test for both the executing and 
the issuing judicial authority.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Joachim Vogel, Spencer, J. R., 'Proportionality and the European arrest warrant' (2010) Criminal Law Review 
474, 474;  
83 Case of Patrick Connor, in Fair Trials International, The European Arrest Warrant eight years on- Time to 
amend the FD? 4.  
84 Council, Report on France Council Doc. No 9972/2/07, 20 July 2007) 23 
85 Council, Report on Italy, Doc. 5832/2/09 REV 2, March 2009) 11, FN 1 
86 Case Sandru v Government of Romania, 28 October 2009 EWHC 2879 
87 Brière, 'Critical Assessment of the existing European arrest warrant framework decision'34 
88 Ibid 34-38;  
89 Elspeth Guild, Europe's Most Wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System 28 
90 International, The European Arrest Warrant eight years on- Time to amend the FD? Para 7  
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The institutions call the issuing judicial authority to conduct an explicit proportionality test 
and to take into account certain criteria.91 The Commission further suggests that the issuing 
authority should explain on the EAW form the reasons why the mechanism is used.92 
Member States also agree that a proportionality check should be applied by the issuing 
authority as well.93 This approach moreover gains ground with the national courts.94 Lord 
Philips argued that the ‘the scheme of the EAW should be reconsidered in order to make 
express provision for consideration of proportionality’.95 It is also argued by the civil society 
that Art. 2 should be amended so that “an EAW may not be issued unless the requesting state 
is satisfied that the person’s extradition from another MS is necessary and proportionate”.96 
The latter suggestion is counter argued on grounds of the reference to proportionality in a 
plethora of resources97 at any relevant level of legal hierarchy, arguably renders the above-
mentioned proposal unnecessary. However, since the test is not conducted by all the judicial 
                                                          
91 EU, Revised version of the European handbook on how to issue a European arrest warrant 14; European 
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authorities, despite the consensus by Member States and institutions, the suggestion does not 
seem to be that pointless.98  
This contribution does not aim to suggest another solution or to analyse the current ones. It 
rather aims to shed some light to the actual test which admittedly should be conducted by the 
judicial authorities. In view of the overall consensus, it is necessary, crucial and time-
sensitive to inform the substantial content of the desired proportionality check that is 
wholeheartedly suggested. The paper, embarking from the common ground of the need to 
insert proportionality into the surrender system, draws on the substantial content of this test 
with reference to the different stages of review. It is suggested here that the judicial 
authorities should not limit their test as to whether the EAW is manifestly disproportionate 
but that they should go through every stage of the test. 
Legitimate objective 
The first stage of the proportionality based analysis determines that the contested measure 
aims to achieve a legitimate objective. Here, when the judicial authorities are facing a 
situation when an EAW may be issued they should always reflect on framework decision 
objective. The Commission adds emphasis to the objective of the law. The issuing authority 
specifically should ensure that the extradition is necessary, emphasising the discretionary 
character of the instrument.99 The judicial authority before issuing a warrant should consider 
the objective for which the framework decision was initially adopted.  
As the objective was preventing criminals to take flight within the borderless Europe in cases 
of serious cross-border crimes, the issuing authority should apply a proportionality test in 
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concreto in order to avoid the excessive use of the EAW. The framework decision’s objective 
is to abolish the slow and complicated extradition system and replace it with a quick and 
simplified system of surrender between judicial authorities.100 The EAW, according to the 
teleological approach suggested by the Commission, should be used by the issuing authority 
when it is necessary to have the requested person on the country’s territory, as the instrument 
provides that an ‘EAW may be issued for acts...’.101  
The link to the objective of the framework decision should be established so as not to end up 
issuing EAWs for suspects of minor offences. The framework decision was not adopted for 
the purpose of addressing issues of minor criminality in Europe. The historical circumstances 
under which the instrument was adopted should not be ignored when the judicial authorities 
consider the objective of the framework decision. The instrument was urgently adopted in the 
context of the EU counter terrorism policy, which is demonstrated by the short timeline of its 
adoption; the framework decision was adopted only nine months following Commission’s 
proposal.102 It should not be forgotten that the impact of counter terrorism policies was 
significant.103 
Necessity test-The least restrictive measure  
At the stage it is established that the measure that is chosen is the least restrictive one but 
adequately effective at the same time. The ratio of proportionality requires more than one 
options. The choices are assessed so that the least restrictive but still effective option will be 
                                                          
100 EAW,  recital 5 
101 EAW, Art 2(1) 
102 See Weyembergh, 'L'impact du 11 septembre sur l'équilibre sécurité/liberté dans l'espace pénal européen';  
103 Murphy, EU Counter-Terrorism Law; Pre-emption and the Rule of Law, 183; Theodore Konstadinides, 'The 
Perils of 'Europeanisation' of Extradition Procedures in the EU Mutuality, Fundamental Rights and 
Constitutional Guarrantees' in Cristina Eckes and Theodore Konstadinides (ed), Crime within the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public Order (Cambridge University Press 2011) 192 
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eventually selected. It follows that using the coercive mechanism of arrest and surrender to 
another Member State should be necessary and should be the least restrictive option. Article 2 
(1) of the framework decision states that an EAW ‘may be issued’ rather than ‘should/must 
be issued’. The Council also introduced an amendment to the handbook as regards 
proportionality, which sets out several factors to be considered before issuing an EAW.104 
The list includes the seriousness of the offence, a possibility of detention, the penalty which 
is likely to be imposed, effective protection of the public and the interests of the victims of 
the offence. It suggests particularly that a warrant should not be issued when the coercive 
measure could be other than detention.105 
Some available relevant measures, which could be considered by the judicial authorities are 
the framework decision on probation decisions, or the framework decision on custodial 
sentences.106 It is therefore argued that these measures should further inform the application 
of the proportionality test, alongside with other criteria suggested at the handbook.107  
Stricto-sensu proportionality 
As long as the previous stages are successful the judicial authorities should finally assess 
whether the process is manifestly disproportionate. In order to assess this element, the 
judicial authorities should consider the different competing interests in ‘extradition’.  
                                                          
104 EU, Revised version of the European handbook on how to issue a European arrest warrant 14 
105 Ibid14; Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council; On the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States100 
106 Stéphanie Bosly Daniel Flore, Amandine Honhon, Jacqueline Maggio (ed), Probation Measures and 
Alternative Sanctions in the European Union (Intersentia 2012 ) 537-538 
107 EU, Revised version of the European handbook on how to issue a European arrest warrant, 14 
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An interesting development is worth considering.108 The judicial direction suggested for 
extradition involves a table with categories of offences whose seriousness shall not justify the 
extradition on the grounds that it is disproportionate, ‘unless there are exceptional 
circumstances’.109 The table involves the offences of ‘minor theft, minor financial offences 
(forgery, fraud, tax offences), minor road traffic, driving and related offences, minor public 
order offences, minor criminal damage and possession of controlled substance of a very small 
quantity and intended for personal use’.110 The categories are further qualified with examples. 
The exceptions regard cases which involve ‘vulnerable victims, 
crime committed against someone because of their disability, gender, identity, race, religion 
or belief, or sexual orientation, significant premeditation, multiple counts, 
extradition also sought for another offence, previous offending history’. The Criminal 
Practice Directions constitutes a useful consolidation of informed judicial guidance over 
balancing the different interests of extradition.  
 
Conclusion  
Proportionality, which is explored here, has plentiful and diverse functions. The paper, 
engaging with only one aspect of the principle, attempted to shed some light on its impact in 
the context of mutual recognition in EAW. The paper places emphasis both on central and 
national judicial review. It firstly examined how the recent judgments of the CJEU would 
have been different had the Court applied a proportionality test. It then proceeded to the 
proportionality test to be conducted by the national judicial authorities when they are faced 
                                                          
108 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Criminal Practice Directions Amendment No. 2  [2014] EWCA Crim 
1569 
109 Ibid para 17 A.3 
110 Ibid para 17 A.5 
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with ostensibly disproportionate cases. In Radu analysis, it was argued that the seriousness of 
the violation and whether the violation is remediable are certain criteria to be considered at 
the stage of stricto sensu proportionality. It is argued that the seriousness must be so crucial 
that the person is absolutely divested by the possibility to defend himself. In Melloni analysis, 
it was argued that the principle of mutual recognition albeit a fundamental, it should not be 
treated as an objective but as a means to the objectives pursued. Finally, the paper critically 
examined the problem of disproportionate EAWs and suggested that the national judicial 
authorities should also involve a proportionality test in their reasoning.  
The full impact of the principle of proportionality still remains to be developed with regard to 
other rights involved in CJEU case law. Moreover, a consolidation of the occasions which led 
to a diversion of the national judicial authorities of the central path of mutual recognition 
would truly enlighten the impact of proportionality on mutual recognition and EAW. Finally, 
a comprehensive development by the CJEU of stricto-sensu proportionality criteria in the 
event of fundamental rights breaches would certainly play a significant role.  
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